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INTERIM REPORT 
THE CAISSE NATIONALE DE CREDIT AGRICOLE OF NIGER: 
DEVELOPMENT, PERFORMANCE AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The LOng-Term Development History of the CNCA: 
Issues and Problems 
For almost 20 years the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole 
has carried out the function of channelling fundti, for the most 
part indirectly through para-statal organizations, towards the 
Nigerien rural-sector. The vast majority of the loans currently 
outstanding are non performing and disbursement of new loans is 
slowing down. There is a persistent liquidity strain. The CNCA 
is still poor in skilled human resources and has not developed 
effective procedures for supplying and managing financial 
services. 
Two factors at the origin of CNCA are useful in interpreting 
its subsequent performance. First, the new financial institution 
was created within the framework of the sectoral specialization 
adopted in shaping Niger's banking system. Accordingly, the CNCA 
was empowered to carry out only financial operations that would 
service economic activity in rural areas. 
In mature financial systems specialization by sector may 
occasionally occur as a natural outgrowth of consolidation and 
concentration of specific skills developed over long periods of 
time. In a young financial system, on the other hand, speciali-
zation by sector is more likely to reflect a lack of concern for 
the development of financial skills and institutions per se. 
This early specialization tends to create a financial institution 
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that becomes a mere administrative support function in favor of 
other predefined development goals. The latter attitude seems 
to apply to the Nigerien case, although it must be recognized 
that the scope of action of the CNCA was defined originally in 
its statute in fairly broad terms. 
In the second place, the CNCA was created through the 
division of the Union Nigerienne de Cr edit et de Coop eration 
(UNCC) into two separate bodies: the CNCA and the UNCC itself, 
a public body with administrative purposes incorporated in the 
former Ministry of Rural Development. The UNCC had originally 
been established to provide greater central control over coopera-
tives and with time had taken on a variety of functions from 
input supply, to credit distribution, peanut marketing, seed 
distribution, the management of development projects, coopera-
tive education, farmer training, functional literacy, supplying 
products of primary necessity, and distributing grain in time of 
scarcity. Some of these functions were subsequently transferred 
to other specialized agencies, as in the case of the Office 
des Produits vivriers du Niger (OPVN), established in 1970, 
the Office National des Am enagements Hydro-Agricoles (ONAHA) 
established in 1978, or to specialized services still within 
the UNCC, like the Centrale d'Approvisionnement (C.A.) created 
in 1978 and the Ateliers de fabrication d~ mat eriel agricole. 
When the credit function was passed ovei to the CNCA, strong 
links were maintained. For example, by law the Chairman and the 
members of the board of the UNCC were respectively the Chairman 
and members of the board of the CNCA; from a functional point 
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of view, the representative of each agency at the department 
level was one and the same until 1980, when the Government took 
a firmer stand in trying to set up the CNCA as a full-fledged 
"agricultural credit institution." The CNCA, moreover, continues 
to rely heavily on the Offices et Soci~t~s de'Economie Mixte 
(OSEM's) both as a device for indirectly channeling credit to 
farmers and to perform some critical functions in identifying, 
selecting and monitoring its own direct customers. Transferr-
ing the credit function to the CNCA did not automatically create 
the necessary banking skills nor were the extension and follow-up 
skills of the OSEM's improved. on the contrary, incentives were 
created that made the situation worse on both fronts. 
The CNCA, trapped by its mission, could not afford to 
establish contact with its ultimate borrowers in the rural areas 
because, given its small sized staff, this would imply a reduced 
coverage and an increased selectivity in credit distribution. 
Therefore the CNCA's role of working through other institutions 
to reach the final farm-borrower reduced its chances of learning 
how to perform effectively its own banking functions. It could 
not develop direct "bank-customer" relationships. From the point 
of view of learning processes within the CNCA the situation was 
not improved when Productivity Projects (PPs) entered the scene. 
The predefined goals embedded in the projects' programs and 
prescriptions can erect a strong barrier to any attempt by an 
external institution, like CNCA, to understa'ld and much less 
participate in the loan evaluation and loan administration 
activity where the project operates. This effect is compounded 
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when the project can count on its own lines of credit. In 
short the CNCA becomes a mere conduit to channel funds rather 
than actively participating in the decision making process in 
assessing the risk, and credit-worthiness of potential clients. 
The OSEM's and PP's, on the other hand, find in this 
situation incentives to reduce the quality of their own perfor-
mance both with regard to supporting services offered to the 
CNCA and in their own current operations. In the first place, 
transferring loans from their books to the CNCA obviously 
reduced the concern and responsibility shown by their own agents 
in assessing creditworthiness, follow-up activities and credit 
collection on behalf of the CNCA. In the second place, the 
opportunity to influence credit allocation and loan repayment 
can create for the OSEM's and the PP's a situation in which the 
negative effects of their own possible, inappropriate technologi-
cal advice and even fraud can be temporarily covered up with 
resources borrowed directly by them or by their project farmers. 
The distribution of these loan resources can mitigate the losses 
growing out of poor research and extension work and reduce the 
complaints of the farmer-borrowers if they do not have to be 
repaid. In short, as long as the loan program is labelled 
"experimental" and the experiment proves deficient, then the 
OSEM's and PP's can save face with their farmer-borrowers by 
not pushing aggressively for loan repayment. 
Thus, paradoxically, recourse by the CNCA to the OSEM's and 
PP's for supporting services in credit delivery and loan repay-
ment can possible result in creating incentives and opportunities 
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for these same entities to work against rather than in support of 
loan repayment. This is to be expected when the same entity that 
is a borrower (i.e. the OSEM's and PP's) also assumes a role as a 
credit officer and loan collection agent for another entity which 
is its creditor such as the CNCA. The conflict of interest 
inherent in these split roles weakens and eventually destroys 
rigorous loan management and loan recovery practices. 
Thus the CNCA is defenseless because it has very limited 
control over the resources it lends. This was made clear in 
1981-82 when the CNCA tried to enforce a more aggressive loan 
repayment policy. Angry borrowers managed to divert the sources 
from which their loans were drawn towards other financial institu-
tions thus precipitating the CNCA into a deeper financial crisis. 
In this arrangement the CNCA obviously stands to lose 
inasmuch as the stated reasons from moving the donor's lines of 
credit to other financial institutions identifies a false target, 
i.e. the poor level of service provided by the CNCA. However, 
the fact that the CNCA did not develop the necessary skills and 
procedures to provide effective banking services, while true, is 
somewhat beside the point in a "wholesale" credit distribution 
system like the one that links the CNCA to the OSEM's and the 
PP's. The initial identification of lending opportunities, risk 
assessment and client selection, and related administrative pro-
cedures are undertaken by the OSEM's and the PP's staff. on 
the other hand, the fact that these project~ run huge operating 
deficits, and are not able to reimburse their loans nor control 
and organize project farmers-beneficiaries to reimburse their own 
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loans, illustrates the true problem area in the system that Niger 
has adopted for channelling financial resources to the rural 
sector. 
In this framework the financial entity is not considered an 
intrinsically useful institution in its own right, but rather a 
mere administrative device completely subordinated to the purpose 
of channelling credit towards predefined uses. These uses are 
not chosen by loan beneficiaries, but by a development agency 
whose task is to stimulate the adoption of specific technologies 
or practices to increase output. such an approach does not 
provide the incentives to develop within the financial institu-
tion the appropriate managerial and banking skills, needed to 
administer a loan portfolio and develop through time a healthy 
bank-client relationship. 
2. Main Structural Features. 
The CNCA was established in 1967 (loi n~ 67-032, 29.09.1967) 
as a public sector institution with commercial goals registered 
in the official list of banking and financial institutions 
(arret! n.u 364, 17.12.1968). The CNCA is fully owned by the 
Government of Niger and is under the control of the Finance 
Minister. Its headquarters are in Niamey and it operates over 
the entire national territory. Within the limits established by 
current laws and banking regulations, the CNCA is empowered to 
carry out any financial operation that could benefit economic 
activity in rural areas - namely farming and livestock raising 
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(at the production, marketing or transportation levels), fishing 
and rural handicrafts (d~cret nv 68-57/MF, 8.04.1968). 
According to the by-laws the organizational structure of the 
CNCA is comprised of the following decision -making bodies; a 
Board of Directors, a Technical credit committee, (which assists 
the Board of Directors in implementing credit policies and makes 
decisions concerning loans exceeding CFA F. 300,0UO}; Depart-
mental Technical Committees (COTEDEPs, which evaluate credit 
granting decisions for cooperatives at the departement level); 
the Arrondissement Technical committees (COTEARs, which provide a 
consultative function for the decisions taken by COTEDEPs); the 
Director (nominated by the consei1 des Ministres) can be admitted 
to the Board meetings with consultative functions and can grant 
credit on his own initiative within a CFA F. 300,000 limit per 
loan, apd Branch Managers (with a credit limit per loan fixed at 
CFA F. 100,000). 
The functional employment structure of CNCA consists of 3 
persons in the Direction Generale and four Central Departments: 
General Affairs (11 persons), Accounting (14 persons), credit 
(15 persons), Inspection (2 persons). At the same time the CNCA 
operates through five branches: Niamey (17 persons), Dosso (10 
persons), Tahoua (10 persons), Maradi (12 persons), Zinder (11 
persons). Each branch has its own credit section and Accounting 
and Administrative section. 
The total number of personnel was 109 (?f which four are on 
external training programs) at the end of 1984-85. The distribu-
tion of personnel by level and average salary is as follows: 
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Number Average Salary (CFA 
1982-83 1984-85 1984-85 
-----
subordinate staff 32 33 406,136 
Executive Staff 43 24 696,951 
Middle Management 20 41 1,261,035 
Officers 15 11 2,105,559 
Total 110 109 
According to a 1983 survey 60% of the personnel was less 
than 30 years old and another 30 % was 30 to 40 years old, while 
78% did not have a high-school diploma. 
3. Liability Management. 
The structure of liabilities and capital of the CNCA is 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. The Ratio of Capital and Reserves to 
total assets - which will be discussed further on with regard to 
its impact on profitability - defines the financial leverage of 
the bank. The lower the ratio, the higher the leverage. Table 2 
shows that this ratio varies from a maximum of about 19% at the 
end of 1978/79 to a minimum of 12.50% at the end of 1982/83 
with an average of 15% over the period 1978/79 - 1983/84. This 
depends on the percentage increase of Reserves and capital 
relative to the rate of growth of total assets. 
Given the practical absence of inflows of fresh capital, the 
rate of growth of Reserves and capital depen1s - in the case of 
F •) 
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TABLE 1 
C.N.C.A. - LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL (% composition at end of year) 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Central Bank 52.1 34.6 30.5 30.7 41.9 35.2 
Checking Accounts 1.1 2.2 2.1 6.7 4.2 4.0 
Current Accounts 1.3 1.4 5.6 2.7 2.1 3.0 
Banks & Correspondents 1.9 4.0 5.5 3.6 1.0 
Deferred Payments 0.8 0.7 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.8 
Fixed-term Deposits 17.0 24.6 18.0 18.5 13.6 13.9 
Lines of Credit 6.2 14.6 18.0 14.1 13.6 17.4 
Adjustment Accounts 0.9 3.4 2.6 7.8 8.6 7.9 
Reserves & Guarantee Funds 5.7 4.8 7.3 5.6 5.0 6.2 
Undistributed Profits 1.0 1.6 3.1 
Capital 12.6 7.9 6.7 5.9 4.8 5.4 
Current Profit 0.6 1.9 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activit~, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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TABLE 2 
CNCA: CAPITAL/ASSET RATIOS 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cap. & Reserves/ 
Total Assets (%) 18.9 14.6 15.2 13.5 12.5 15.9 
Cap. & Reserves 
Increase (%) 21.2 17.4 1.2 14.4 12.6 
Total Assets 
Increase (%) 56.7 12.6 14.6 22.6 -10.9 
A. Cap. & Reserves 
(M. CFA F.) 1,357.6 1,646.0 1,931.7 1,955.1 2,237.1 256.2 
B. Long-tenn Assets 
(M.CFA F.) 181.60 223.9 339.6 392.3 256.5 62.6 
A./B. (%) 7.5 7.4 5.7 5.0 8.7 40.3 
c. Risky Assets 
(M. CFA F.) 7,025.2 10,750.0 12,084.0 13.595.8 16,823.1 14,592.6 
A./C. (%) 19.3 15.3 16.0 14.4 13.7 17.3 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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the CNCA - completely on the rate of accumulation of reserves 
and undistributed profits. Therefore, any doubt concerning the 
amount of income devoted to loan loss provisions and net profit 
affects the effective value of the capital/asset ratio. This is 
especially relevant when considering the ratio of capital and 
Reserves over Long-term Assets or over Risky Assets (as in Table 
2} in order to draw conclusions on the financial vr risk coverage 
afforded by the given capital structure. Evidence on the unreli-
ability of the figures for profits or loan loss provisions can 
sometimes be seen in the level of Extraordinary Items in the 
Profit and Loss Account and the level of Adjustment Accounts in 
the Asset and Liabilities Account. The improved risk coverage 
ratios of the CNCA in Table 2 can be misleading and should be 
assessed, in light of the growing incidence of Extraordinary 
Items (which we explore later in Table 12) and of Adjustment 
Accounts in Table 1. We will return to this issue later. 
capital and Reserves represent long-term resources which 
in the current institutional arrangements do not bear an explicit 
cost. Therefore they are considered the cheapest source of funds 
for the CNCA although the opportunity cost involved in their uses 
should always be considered. 
Selected liabilities in Table 3 identify funds borrowed in 
domestic and external financial markets. The variability of the 
rate of growth is very marked among different types of liabili-
ties and especially over time. This is explained by the very 
narrow base for change and by the concentration of funding 
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TABLE 3 
CNCA - SELECTED LIABILITIES 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage Changes---
Central Bank 4.01 -0.73 15.32 67.51 -25.17 
Checking Accounts 208.20 5.80 273.52 -23.03 -15.90 
Current Accounts 64.18 352.02 -45.81 -4.66 27.75 
Banks & Correspondents 236.64 54.58 -24.39 -66.43 -100.00 
Fixed Term Deposits 126.52 -17.48 17.46 -9.51 -8.87 
Ext. Lines of Credit 270.20 39.01 -10.27 18.52 13.73 
Total 60.2 10.3 -9.7 49.3 14.3 
---Percentage Composition---
Central Bank 42.5 38.3 40.2 54.8 47.9 
Checking Accounts 2.7 2.6 8.8 5.5 5.4 
Current Accounts 1.7 7.0 3.5 2.7 4.1 
Banks & Correspondents 4.9 6.9 4.7 1.3 
Fixed Term Deposits 30.2 22.6 24.3 17.8 18.9 
Ext. Lines of Credit 17.9 22.6 18.5 17.9 23.7 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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sources for each type of liability. This extreme instability and 
lack of diversification of funding also affects the aggregate 
rate of change and, eventually, the overall rate of growth for 
the institution. 
The predominant sources of funds are either from the 
government or external donors. The Central Bank's rediscount 
lines accounted for 44.7% of total borrowing, on the average, 
over the period, while fixed-term deposits (mostly from the 
Treasury) and external lines of credit from international donors, 
under very soft conditions, accounted respectively for 22.8% and 
20.1% on average. At the end of 1983-84 these sources {3 in all) 
accounted for 90.59% of CNCA's borrowed funds. 
The drop in "checking and current accounts" and in "banks 
and correspondents" during 1982 and 1983 is related to the 
already mentioned reaction of project authorities to the new, 
more aggressive loan repayment stand then adopted by the CNCA and 
by the cumulative effect of the CNCA's subsequent treasury diffi-
culties on the confidence of other depositors. 
The CNCA's composition of borrowed funds, on the other hand, 
does not stimulate the development of the skills and procedures 
required to approach the general public for deposit collection. 
Nor does the CNCA benefit from the incentives that dealing with 
regular depositors from the public creates in order to improve 
banking skills and other operating procedures such as effective 
loan evaluation and risk analysis, liquidity ;nd cash management, 
and loan recovery practices. 
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The composition of sources also has an impact on the level 
and fluctuation of financial charges. The CNCA obtains 60-70% 
of its borrowed funds (Central Bank rediscounts and Treasury 
fixed term deposits) at rediscount rates which are systematically 
higher and stickier than the normal deposit rates for the public 
established in the Nigerien banking system. 
In summary, when the structure of liabilities (i.e. the 
sources of funding) of a financial institution servicing agricul-
ture is dominated by government rediscount lines of credit or 
international donor funds, the institution becomes "borrower-
dominated." Namely, all the loan procedures and administrative 
practices are designed to favor borrowers' interest. Detailed 
farm budget studies and targeted clientele are emphasized (to 
introduce new technology or increase output) while rigorous 
credit-worthy analyses on the probability of loan repayment 
and loan recovery procedures and practices are minimized. 
In contrast, when the source of funds is dominated by 
deposits from the public at large, the institution becomes 
"depositor-dominated" in its operational philosophy. Loan 
management and administrative procedures are designed to favor 
and protect depositor interests. High cost end-use or loan 
targeting programs are minimized, while loan evaluation and 
credit-worthiness analyses (including risk analysis) are empha-
sized. At the same time loan recovery procedures are highlighted 
and loan recovery efforts are pursued aggressively. Borrower-
dominated financial institutions frequently experience severe 
financial difficulties since financial viability is not a 
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dominant priority. Depositor-dominated financial institutions, 
on the other hand, are usually much more solvent, since the 
survival of the financial institution is important for depositor 
interests and thus institutional viability rapidly becomes a 
dominant feature of managerial strategy and practices. As the 
foregoing analysis makes clear, the structure of liabilities 
(sources of funds) of the CNCA makes it a classic example of a 
borrower-dominated institution, dependent upon government and 
donor funds, with all the associated weaknesses of those insti-
tutions, in particular its lack of financial viability. We 
will pursue this theme further in the rest of this report. 
4. Asset Management. 
The portfolio of financial assets of the CNCA - 99% of which 
consists of loans and overdrafts - recorded an average annual 
growth of 17.6 percent over 1979/80 - 1983/84 (including doubtful 
loans net of provisions). The average rate of growth over the 
same period, excluding doubtful loans (see Table 4), was 16.9% 
for overdrafts, 23.1% for short-term loans and 25.7% for medium-
term loans. The rates of growth for each type of loan are 
extremely variable over time possibly because of unstable season-
ality coupled with end of period-data and most certainly because 
of the very high concentration of borrowing entities. The abrupt 
shifts in program funding through government and international 
sources (noted earlier in Table 3) introduces equally abrupt 
shifts in the loan activity documented in Table 4. These rapid 
shifts in liabilities and assets complicate loan management 
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practices and compromise efficient loan recovery. For example, 
farm-borrowers (or cooperatives) are not inclined to repay loans 
to an institution experiencing funding problems, since the 
reward for repaying a loan (i.e. getting a new loan) appears 
unlikely. Thus a growing image of instability in funding sources 
will induce a rising rate of delinquent behavior among borrowers. 
Starting in 1983/84 and continuing in 1984/85 a negative 
rate of change is recorded for all types of loans, not taking 
into account loans classified as doubtful which tripled over the 
same period. The decline in total loans outstanding is explained 
by the decision of the CNCA to stop granting credit to borrowers 
that did not have an acceptable repayment record, the elimination 
of all crop season lending, the diversion of "credit 
programs« from the CNCA towards other banks and towards the 
development projects themselves. 
seventy percent of the CNCA loan portfolio consists of 
overdrafts and short-term loans while 30% is comprised of medium 
term loans in 1983/84 (see Table 4). overdrafts fall into five 
main groups (see Table 5). crop loans until 1983-84 
consisted mostly of loans to OPVN and, to a much smaller degree, 
to Riz du Niger and sonara; input supply loans mostly to central 
d'Approvisionnement~ prefinancing loans mainly for Productivity 
Projects, (i.e. credit granted as an advance on the expected 
disbursement of lines of credit obtained from external donors 
or the Fonds National d'Investissement); advances to ONAHA and 
directly to some Am~nagement Hydro-Agricoles; and other advances 
on current account to Productivity Projects. 
TABLE 4 
CNCA - FINANCIAL ASSETS 
(Increase %) 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
IT) {2) (3) (4) (5) (6) -m 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank -- -57.5 541.0 -78.0 112.7 -21.9 
Banks & Correspondents -- 119.6 37.8 -96.0 284.3 349.5 
Overdrafts -- 37.8 5.5 21.0 36.4 -16.1 -5.6 
Short-Term Loans -- -30.6 155.9 -10.6 14.4 -13.8 -80.8 
Medium-Term Loans 
-- 111.9 18.1 -0.9 3.5 -4.0 -23.8 
Doubtful Loans less Provisions -- -- 29.2 66.2 -63.9 -100.0 
t-
TOTAL 
-- 52.9 13.3 10.8 24.0 -12.9 
..... 
------% Composition------
Cash, CCP, Central Bank 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Banks & rJrrespondents 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.04 0.1 0.6 
Overdrafts 69.7 62.8 58.5 63.9 70.3 67.7 
Short-Term Loans 3.5 1.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.6 
Medium-Term Loans 24.3 33.7 35.1 31.4 26.2 28.9 
Doubtful Loans less Provisions 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.5 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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Loans in the first 4 groups comprised only 66 accounts in 
1983/84 although their share in the total loan portfolio of the 
CNCA was about 50% in value terms. other advances on current 
account comprised another 111 accounts (14% of the total value of 
loans outstanding). As far as loan concentration is concerned, 
the situation was practically unchanged in 1984/85 except tor 
the very marked reduction in the value of crop loans partially 
balanced by the increase in other advances and input supply 
loans. This situation reflects the fact that overdrafts only 
benefit farmers indirectly. The customers of the CNCA in this 
case are neither cooperatives nor individual borrowers in the 
rural areas, but government agencies with various functions in 
the Nigerien rural environment such as the marketing of output, 
input supply, equipment production, territorially or technology 
based extension services, and project and infrastructure 
management. 
Short-term loans, on the other hand, are concentrated on 
cooperatives and individuals. They accounted for 52% of the 
number but only 2.9% of the value of total loans outstanding in 
1984/85 (52% and 2.7% respectively in 1983/84). The total number 
of customers involved in these operations was 1.500 for coopera-
tives and 3.400 for individuals both in 1983-84 and in 1984-85. 
The main stated destinations of these loans are the financing of 
land preparation, farm equipment, cattle fattening programs, 
horticultural product marketing and irrigated area production 
campaigns - until the interruption initiated by the CNCA in 
1982/83 due to unbearable default problems by the A.H.A. 
TABLE 5 
CNCA: DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY BENEFICIARIES 
Beneficiaries Number of Accounts Amount Outstanding Doubtful loans 
(M. CFA F.) (M. CFA F.) (%) 
Date 30.9.84 3.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 
rrr (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Medium - Term 
Cooperatives 1.160 1.160 2,299.4 2,531.8 31.4 362.3 1.37 14.31 
OS EMs 5 5 596.3 383.0 
State 1 1 1,016.1 338.2 
Individuals 3.219 3.219 665.2 641.0 300.2 298.3 45.13 46.54 
Short - Term 
Cooperative 1.548 1.548 208.7 256.3 10.8 256.3 5.13 100.0 
Individuals 3.396 3.396 202.0 143.5 74.8 69.7 37.13 48.58 
Overdrafts 
Crop loans 2 1 2,522.2 150.9 
Input supply 5 5 2,629.0 3,430.3 
Pre financing 16 16 762.9 567.1 
Advances ONAHA and AHA 43 43 2,072.7 2,390.9 
Other Advances on c/a 111 111 2,164.8 ~084.9 189.3 220.0 8.74 7.13 
TOTAL 9,506 9,505 15,199.4 13,918.0 606.7 1,206.7 3.99 8.67 
Source: CNCA, unpublished data 
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Medium-term loans accounted for 46% of the number and 28% 
of the value of total loans outstanding at the end of 1984/85 
(46% and 30% respectively at the end of 1983/84). An important 
although decreasing proportion of these loans (35% at the end of 
1983-84 and 19% at the end of 1984/85} is accounted for by the 
consolidation of loans granted to crop marketing agencies, like 
OPVN, SONARA, Riz du Niger, and by one loan granted to the 
Nigerien Government (on which no interest is accruing according 
to the notes to the financial statement for 1983-84). The rest 
of the medium-term portfolio is represented by loans to coopera-
tives and to individuals (65% and 16.5% at the end of 1984-85~ 
and 50% and 14.8% at the end of 1983-84). The main stated 
destination of loans in the case of cooperatives is the acquisi-
tion of collective farm equipment especially within the Produc-
tivity Projects. other stated purposes for individual loans are 
preparation and planting of orchards, cattle herd reconstitu-
tion, seed storage (mainly for groundnuts). The value of the 
average outstanding loan to cooperatives of medium-term maturity 
was CFA F. 2.2 M at the end of 1984-85 (CFA F. 1.9 Mat the end 
of 1983-84). 
From the above it can be seen that the bulk of retail 
lending by the CNCA, i.e. loans directly granted to cooperatives 
and Individuals, is concentrated in short-and medium-term loans 
(see Table 6). However, as already mentioned, the proportion of 
these loans to the total value of loans outstanding is insignifi-
cant ~xcept for medium-term credit to cooperatives. The average 
amount per loan is so low - especially for short-term loans 
TABLE 6 
CNCA: "RETAIL" LENDING 
Proportion of Total Proportion of Total Average Amount Incidence of 
Number of Loans Value of Loans per Loan Doubtful Loans 
(%) (%) (CFA F. I 000) (%) 
1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85 
IT) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Short-Term 
Coops 16.3 16.3 1.4 1.8 134.9 165.6 5.2 100.0 
Individuals 35.7 35.7 1.3 1.0 59.5 42.3 37.1 48.6 
MeditDll-Term N 
1-' 
Coops 12.2 12.2 15.1 18.2 1,982.3 2,192.6 1.4 14.3 
Individuals 33.9 33.9 4.4 4.6 206.6 199.1 45.1 46.5 
Source: CNCA, unpublished data. 
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-that it is difficult to assume that the net interest margin is 
sufficient to cover operating costs. If, for example, the cost 
of funds is assumed to be equal to the preferential rediscount 
rate, this margin is fixed at 2.5 per cent, inclusive of commis-
sions, for all loans to cooperatives. This means CFA F. 2.500 
annually on a loan for CFA F.100,000, which represents a cost 
of about 3 man/hours of work time valued at the average cost of 
personnel for the CNCA. Clearly more time is spent processing 
these loans if one includes the entire range of screening, 
documentation, disbursement and monitoring staff time within the 
CNCA and its associated para-statal partners. A larger interest 
rate margin to cover these operational costs and risk is clearly 
in order. This cost is increased if the loan does not stay on 
the books for the whole period and appropriate provisions for 
losses are taken into consideration. As a matter of fact most 
of the accumulated provisions for losses (70-80%) relate to 
there retail loans (see column 8, Table 5). 
A summary review of the relevant interest rate margins for 
the main classes of loans in the CNCA are as follows for 1984-85: 
Discount Risk Margin Management 
Rate (Regulated Commission 
(BCEAO) bX BCEAO) Char~ed bl: CNCA 
Crop loans 8.0% 1.5% About 1.0% 
Input supply loans 8.0 1.5 About 1.0 
Prefinancing loans 10.5 5.0 Unspecifi""d 
Cooperatives (short 
and medium-term) 8.0 2.0 0.5 
~dium-term ( excl. 
Cooperatives 10.5 s.o unspecified 
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Moving now from the issue of interest rate margins to the 
loan portfolio itself, it is clear that the quality of the loan 
portfolio of CNCA has been steadily deteriorating over the years. 
The CNCA reports as doubtful only those loans granted to indi-
viduals and cooperatives because it considers all other loans 
granted to or guaranteed by the Nigerien Government as secure. For 
example no provision for loan losses has been accumulated for 
loans extended to the OSEMs, for crop and input supply loans, for 
ONAHA and AHA loans nor for prefinancing loans, although many of 
these loans are clearly non-performing. 
The data for doubtful loans reported in column 1 in Table 7, 
therefore, refer only to loans to cooperatives and individuals and 
"other advances on current account" while total loans (column 2} 
include the above mentioned loans to OSEM's and PP's. The 
CNCA has recently increased the loss provisions against these 
loans and considers, 100% of the short-term credit to cooperatives 
and 50% of the short and medium-term credit to individuals as "not 
recoverable." If we accept, for the moment, this unrealistically 
narrow definition of non-performing loans, only 8.7% of the total 
loan portfolio was considered doubtful, and adjusted accordingly 
with increased loan loss provisions at the end of 1984-85 (4% for 
1983-84). An alternative, and more realistic, appraisal of the 
doubtful loan percentage would consider a substantial part of the 
loans to government para-statals (OSEM's and PP's) as equally 
doubtful as those recently written off for ctoperatives and 
individuals. Thus the misleadingly low 8.7 percent estimate 
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TABLE 7 
CNCA - DOUBTFUL LOANS 
Doubtful Loans Total Loans Doubtful Loans as % 
(M. CFA F.) (M.CFA F.) of Total Loans 
(1) (2) (3) 
1982-83 419.3 17,161.7 2.44 
1983-84 606.7 15,199.3 3.99 
1984-85 1,206.7 13,918.0 8.67 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite 1982-83, 1983-84 and unpublished data 
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in Table 7 could very easily be adjusted upwards to something 
approaching a substantial majority of the total portfolio. 
In this situation the stability of the institution is 
undermined in many ways. On the one hand, the absence of loan 
turnover creates great difficulties for the liquidity of the CNCA 
while, on the other hand, profitability is at stake both because 
of the increased cost of funds prompted by the liquidity crisis 
and due to the lost interest income and the loss in the value of 
assets. These effects can only be hidden partially by accounting 
practices. 
The causes of this poor repayment performance of the CNCA 
can be traced to its inability to develop the required managerial 
skills and appropriate procedures to manage its own loan portfolio 
effectively. However, as suggested in the first part of this 
report, this poor performance grew out of the government's view 
that the role of any financial institution in rural development 
should be to serve as an administrative conduit to service other 
institutions or objectives rather than achieving financial 
viability and growth in its own right. As a consequence the 
main"customers" of the CNCA in its "wholesale" role are not the 
final farm-borrowers but rather various Government para-statal 
organizations or productivity projects. Each para-statal agency 
performs a specific function, in a given rural development 
program, and credit is tied in as a required input supporting the 
implementation of various components of these programs. In the 
end, credit is granted through these supporting agencies and the 
CNCA is not involved in either assessing credit worthiness and 
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risks, or controlling the use of credit at the final borrowers 
level. 
Thus the CNCA is unable to determine if a borrower's 
income and cash flow can guarantee complete and timely reimburse-
ment of the loans received. At the same time the Government 
agencies, that presume to play this role for the CNCA, cannot 
carry out these tasks effectively. Evidence to this effect can 
be seen in their own heavy accumulation of arrears whenever the 
para-statal agencies themselves are direct borrowers from the 
CNCA (as in the cases of the C.A. and various PP's). 
Furthermore, when dealing with these agencies, the CNCA does 
not seem to have either the tools or the status to analyze the 
financial profile of the final farm borrowers that these agencies 
propose for financing to the CNCA. Thus the CNCA has often 
entered situations for which cash flow projections were doubtful 
even from a purely administrative point of view (for example in 
the prefinancing of some productivity projects before budgetary 
allocations were committed or came on line). At other times the 
para-statal agency was running operating deficits and covering 
these deficits withborrowed funds from the CNCA, (e.g., ONAHA). 
These deficits could be the result of mismanagement by the 
agencies themselves but sometimes also derived from policies 
adopted by higher authorities (e.g., the case of insufficient 
allocation of resources by the government to fund input subsidy 
programs, resulting in operating losses for the C.A.). it is dif-
ficult to imagine that the CNCA could resist the strong pressure 
to lend (i.e. to help bail out these institutions or make up for 
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"temporary'' budgetary shortfalls) when many government authorities 
have always envisioned its role as a subordinate vehicle to 
facilitate the financing of other programs. 
At the same time, however, the CNCA needs the operating 
support of these agencies when lending is aimed at the ultimate 
farm-level user of funds. This becomes necessary when the CNCA 
funds are expected to reach a larger, more extensive network of 
village-level cooperatives and farmers than its limited branches 
or personnel can service. This goal of extensive coverage implies 
extremely high transaction costs which in fact prevent the CNCA 
from establishing a direct contact with its customers, while the 
targeting goal of reaching selected clientele requires a special-
ized competence again to be found - presumeably - in the external 
para-statal agencies that interpose their action between the CNCA 
and its customers. This is good in theory, but the result is that 
the CNCA ends up performing a purely administrative role, ac-
cepting whatever assessment and allocation of credit that is 
imposed by the external agents that deal directly with the village 
level final borrowers. 
The effect on credit quality is pernicious because the agents 
have not been trained to assess creditworthiness since this is not 
their primary goal. Their main concern is directed towards the 
adoption of specific inputs and technologies. As a consequence of 
this attitude, the customers often do not even realize that they 
are "borrowing" money. Furthermore, credit cen play a perverse 
role in making it possible for the agent to push the "wrong" 
inputs and technologies with the loan resources used to buy the 
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farmers cooperation to adopt these inappropriate inputs. All the 
above mentioned problems are compounded by weaknesses in loan 
management procedures that lead to the impossibility of enforcing 
repayment. Finally, it must be stressed that the perverse 
learning process that has been introduced by the lack of strong 
loan recovery efforts, no doubt weakened loan recovery even for 
borrowers that have a promising repayment capacity. 
5. Profitability. 
The assessment of the CNCA's profitability depends critically 
on judgements concerning the real value of its assets and of 
accrued interest. If the dubious accounting evidence, pointed out 
earlier, is, for the moment, deemed to reflect the true credit 
position of the CNCA vs. its customers, and if the questionable 
policy followed by the CNCA in defining doubtful loans is also 
accepted, then the results in Tables 11-13 can be discussed 
accordingly, but with these caveats always in mind. 
The findings from these tables show that the CNCA manages to 
show a positive net return on its Capital and Reserves, which is 
usually an index of overall efficiency and also correlated to the 
rate of increase in the permanent funds available to the insti-
tution. In general, there is a negative trend, over the past four 
accounting periods (see Table 9) both the profit margin and 
in the gross return on Capital and Reserves. The latter is 
explained by three factors. 
The first factor is the decline in the ratio of interest and 
commissions to average outstandihg financial assets (i.e. gross 
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TABLE 8 
CNCA- REVENUE, COSTS AND PROFIT MARGINS (M.CFA F.) 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income from 
Financial Oper. 537.5 1,030.8 1,281.5 1,664.0 2,230.6 1,899.5 
Charges on CNCA 
Borrowings 282.5 537.9 682.5 1,053.6 1,486. 3 1, 001.5 
Gross Margin on 
Fin. Intermediation 255.0 492.9 599.0 610.4 744.3 898.0 
Provisions for 
Loan Losses 42.6 80.0 217.9 159.6 222.5 360.8 
Net Margin on 
Fin. Intermediation 212.4 412.9 391.1 450.8 521.8 537.2 
Operational Costs 165.5 181.4 308.9 291.0 324.9 285.2 
Operating Margin 46.9 231.5 72.2 159.8 196.9 252.0 
Extraordinary Items -6.1 -15.0 +78.7 -19.8 +3.7 -65.1 
Net Profit 40.8 216.5 150.9 140.0 200.6 186.9 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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TABLE 9 
CNCA - SELECTED FINANCIAL RATIOS 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gross Return on 
Cap. & Reserves (%) (1) 68.6 71.6 85.6 106.4 79.9 
Gross Return on 
Fin. Assets (%) (2) ll.5 11.1 12.8 14.6 12.0 
Incidence of 
Fin. Assets (%) (3) 97.0 96.4 94.4 94.0 93.5 
Financial Leverage (4) 6.2 6.7 7.0 7.7 7.1 
Profit margin (%) (5) 21.0 11.8 8.4 9.0 9.8 
Net Return on 
Captial & Reserves (%) (6) 14.4 8.4 7.2 9.6 7.9 
(1) Income from financial ooperations/Av. Capital and Reserves 
(2) Income from financial operations/Av. Financial Assets 
(3) Average Financial Assets/Average Total Assets 
{4) Average Total As sets/ Average Capital and Reserves 
(5) Net Profit/Income from financial operations 
(6) Net Profit/Average Capital and Reserves = (1) x (5) = (2) x (3) x (4) x (5) 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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return on financial assets). This is in turn related to the 
level of interest rates, the relative weight of interest and 
commissions (depending also on the turnover of the portfolio), the 
composition of the portfolio of loans and the incidence of non 
interest bearing financial assets. In relation to these elements 
the following can be observed: the main interest rates relevant 
for the CNCA (the normal and the preferential rediscount rates, 
see Table 10) began to decrease in 1984 after having reached a 
peak in 1982; overdrafts which bear the highest average return are 
still dominant in the composition of the portfolio, but lost 
ground during 1983/84 (see Tables 4 and 11); the gross return on 
medium-term loans fell sharply in 1983/84 because - according to a 
note to the annual report - interest on a loan to the State was 
not recorded; and finally non interest bearing financial assets 
increased their share over total financial assets during 1982/83 
and 1983/84 to create a better liquidity position (see Table 4). 
The second factor in explaining the declining trend of the 
gross return on Capital and Reserves is the decline in the ratio 
of financial to total assets. This, in turn, depends on the share 
of real assets and other non interest bearing credit items. Real, 
non-financial, assets represent a minimal proportion of total 
assets. The CNCA is still uncontaminated by the marble building 
syndrome which is so common among the worst performing financial 
institutions. The relative share of "other assets" in the case of 
the CNCA tends to reflect the poor accounting procedures in 
tracking operations and sometimes the existence of disputed or 
uncertain profit and loss items. 
TABLE 10 
B.C.E.A.O.: REDISCOUNT RATES 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
TEN (1) 1<---------------------------------- 8.0 ------------->l<--10.5-->l<-----12.5----->l<------10.5 
TEP (2) 1<---------------------------------- 5.5 ------------->1<-- 8 -->1<-----10.0----->1<------ 8 
(l) Taux d'gscompte Normale 
(2) Taux d'Escompte Preferential 
The preferential rate is limited to crop financing, financing for governement authorities {central and local), 
housing loans to UMOA's citizens, and loans to 8mall- and medium-sized enterprises with at least 51 percent 
of the capital held by citizens or institutions of the UMOA with the credit outstanding less than 30 million 
CFA france. 
Source: K.TOH, "Recent Macroeconomic Developments in Niger: Country Situation, Policy, and Outlook", 
USAID/Niamey, 1984. 
w 
1\J 
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TABLE 11 
CNCA - AVERAGE RETURN ON LOANS 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Medium Term 
Interest & Commissions 
(M. CFA F.) 174.8 243.5 270.8 358.4 189.9 
Average Capital 
(M. CFA F.) 2,689.6 3,984.8 4,295.3 4,349.6 4,334.4 
Average Return (%) 6.50 6.11 6.30 8.2 4.4 
Short Term 
Interest & Commissions 
(M. CFA F.) 26.1 68.6 29.1 21.3 10.1 
Average Capital 
(M. CFA F.) 208.3 303.6 413.5 418.4 415.8 
Average Return (%) 12.53 22.60 7.04 5.09 2.4 
Overdrafts 
Interest & Commissions 
(M. CFA F.) 824.5 949.5 1,359.2 1,846.9 1,644.9 
Average Capital 
(M. CFA F.) 5,885.8 7,009.5 7,952.4 10,289.5 10,917.4 
Average Return (%) 14.01 13.55 17.09 17.95 15.07 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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The ratio of total assets to Capital and Reserves (financial 
leverage) amplifies the gross return on Capital and Reserves and, 
when the profit margin is positive, also the net return on 
capital and Reserves. In the case of the CNCA, financial leverage 
is fairly stable, the value of the positive trend being reduced by 
a decrease in the ratio for 1983/84. This behaviour is explained 
only in part by the decision to increase the risk coverage through 
a higher Capital/Asset ratio. It is also the result of the 
decline in the growth rate of the CNCA and its limited borrowing 
capacity. 
The ratio of net profit to income from financial operations 
(the profit margin) shows how much is left of interest income and 
commissions after interest costs, provisions for loan losses and 
operating costs have been covered. The profit margin goes from 
21.0% for 1979/80 to a trough at 8.4% in 1981/82 slightly in-
creasing to 9.8% in 1983/84 (see Tables 12 and 13). 
The incidence of interest costs from the CNCA funding sources 
in Table 12 fluctuates with the general level of interest rates, 
but is particularly sensitive to changes in rediscount rates, 
especially in periods of liquidity strain (like 1982/83), when 
rediscounts from the central bank increased as a proportion of 
total liabilities (see Table 3). The incidence of provisions for 
loan losses generally increased throughout this period in Table 
12. This reflected both the underlying deterioration of credit 
quality and the wise decision adopted by the CNCA to give some 
evidence of this deterioration, through increased provisions for 
bad lo&ns granted to cooperative and individuals. The incidence 
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TABLE 12 
CNCA: PROFIT MARGIN (%) 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Incidence of Charges 
on Borrowings (1) 52.2 53.3 63.3 66.6 52.7 
B. Incidence of Provisions 
for Loan Losses (2) 16.2 36.4 26.4 29.9 40.2 
c. Incidence of Operating 
Costs & Taxes (3) 43.9 81.1 64.4 62.3 53.1 
D. Incidence of Extra-
ordinary Items (4) 6.5 -109.0 12.4 -1.8 -25.8 
Profit Margin (5) 21.0 11.8 8.4 9.0 9.8 
(1) Financial Charges/Income from Financial Operations 
(2) Provisions for loan losses/Gross Margin on Financial Intermediation 
(3) Operating Costs and Taxes/Net Margin on Financial Intermediation 
(4) Extraordinary Items/Operating Margin 
(5) Profit Margin: See Table 9, Note (5) 
Gross Return on 
Financial Assets (%) 
Charges on borrowings/ 
Av. Financial Assets (%) 
Provisions for Loan 
Losses/Av. Fin. Assets (%) 
Operational Costs/ 
Av. Fin. Assets (%) 
Extraordinary Items/ 
Av. Fin. Assets (%) 
Net Return on 
Financial Assets (%) (1) 
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TABLE 13 
CNCA: NET RETURN ON FINANCIAL ASSETS 
1979/80 
(1) 
11.5 
6.0 
0.9 
2.0 
-0.2 
2.4 
1980/81 
(2) 
11.1 
5.9 
1.9 
2.7 
+0.7 
1.3 
1981/82 
(3) 
12.8 
8.1 
1.2 
2.3 
-0.2 
1.1 
1982/83 
(4) 
14.6 
9.8 
1.5 
2.1 
+0.02 
1.3 
1983/84 
(5) 
12.6 
6.3 
2.3 
1.8 
-0.4 
1.2 
{1) Also equal to Gross Return on Financial Assets x Profit Margin, see Table 9. 
Source: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite 1982/83 and 1983/84 
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of operating costs shows a negative trend. Personnel costs are 
the main component. They increased steadily and at a rate higher 
than inflation until 1982-83. This, however, was due to the 
increase in the number of personnel with average costs declining 
in real terms. Overall, the CNCA did not indulge in excessive 
expenditure and controlled effectively its other operating costs. 
The incidence of extraordinary items in Table 12 is related to the 
need to take into consideration profit and loss items that escaped 
appropriate reporting in previous accounting periods. This item 
reflects the difficulty of measuring the performance of the CNCA. 
Relevant factors increasing this item are the inefficiency of the 
CNCA's information system and the disputes surrounding the 
relationship between the CNCA and some of its important para-
statal clients. 
In summary, the various measures of profitability set forth 
in Tables 11-13, show a trend of declining profits in recent years 
reflecting the deterioration of the CNCA's portfolio. However 
these findings are, in fact, even more disturbing in that actual 
profits (in contrast to accounting profits) are no doubt non-
existent. One must not forget that the item " income from 
financial operations" in Table 8 forms the basis for estimating 
the profit ratios in Tables 11, 12 and 13. These estimates are 
based on "accrued" interest, a conventional accounting term that 
considers all the hypothetical (but unpaid) interest earnings for 
delinquent loans of all the OSEM's and PP's ~s revenue, since it 
is accruing on the books of the CNCA. If, instead, one were to 
use actual interest payments received to estimate interest 
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revenue, then the CNCA would be recording losses instead of 
profits and trends, noted above, would be increased losses 
rather than declining profits. 
6. Conclusions and Preliminary Policy Recommendations. 
The deteriorating performance of the CNCA in recent years can 
be largely traced to poor loan management procedures and practices 
and to an operational philosophy that prevented the institution 
from maturing sufficiently to play a relatively "autonomous" role 
as a true intermediary in the rural development of Niger. The 
institution has been forced to channel its loan funds to final 
borrowers on the basis of loan evaluation actions carried out by 
members of other organizations. It has been compromised, further, 
in having these same agents of other para-statal organizations 
undertake loan recovery efforts on its behalf. In short, in being 
relegated to a wholesaleing role, it has not been able to act as a 
bank with a staff acquiring on-site loan evaluation, risk manage-
ment, and loan recovery skills. It has not been able to develop 
direct contact with final borrowers that can mature into a healthy 
bank-client relationship built on trust and understanding. 
Instead, it has been relegated to a subordinate role as an admini-
strative conduit channeling funds earmarked by agents from other 
institutions promoting new technology, adoption of new inputs, 
etc. with the financial viability of the CNCA itself implicitly 
minimized as a predominant priority_ 
The instability of funding sources in the structure of lia-
bilities of the CNCA also introduces uncertainty into the CNCA's 
loan programs and complicatoa loan Adminta~ra~ion, PYrth~fm§~~. 
with all funding coming from intorna~ional donora or th@ tOV@~ft: 
ment's rediscount linea, tho CNCA hal b@OOM@ A "borrow.~ 
dominated" institution. t~• o~aniiAtionai ffAm@WOfk hal Or@a~@Q 
incentives to promote proctdurtl and prAc~iO@I tavortn~ borroW@~§' 
interests. Targeting criteria to rtaeh ltitc~td taFmtrl with new 
inputs is emphasized, whilt ereditworthin@ll, rilk analylil and 
loan recovery procedure• and ~~~orts ar@ minimil@d. The tinanoial 
viability of the in1titution ia not an everridin~ priorit? and 
continual infuaion• of funda have betn needed to IUblidiit th@ 
high lending COitl AIIOeiated with the elp@ftliY@ dlliY@f~ of 
credit and the high inoidoneo of delinquent ioan1. The CNCA il a 
classic example of a borrower dominatld inltitutien. 
~ turn thi• 1ituation around, lfforta will have to be 
un~ertaken to mako tho CNCA a 1111 borrow1r dominatld inatitutien. 
This involve• a aubatantial reordering of prioritioa, a dfa§tie 
change in the philo1ophy of what a financial inatitution 1hould 
an4 abou14 not 4o~ ror8JDOat in thi§ reordoring of prioritiol i§ 
to accept the fact that financial 1ervico1 (both dtp@lit and loan 
service•) and finaneial inte~odiation (botwoon fiaV@f§ and dopo= 
sitor• and betweon r§tiona) can mako a potiitivo eontri§ijtion t§ 
econoaic 4evolop!lont~ lfOwfi'or, thil p§§itivo @OHt~ibYtion @aftMt 
be aa4• tbrou,b unviablo tinaneial intofB@diari@§, 'ijt §iffo~= 
ently, a finaneia11y viable, §81f §U§tiiHiftf, and ~oiatiV@if 
au~ tinan§ia1 in§titutton, Op@~itiftf 1~ it§ initial fli~§ 
at a lwel ~Uf§ only 20 to JO p§~@ont ot th@ §@al@ of tit@ @1\f@A 
at the htlifbt of it§ §f@~ati§n§ in th@ @a!'if 1 f80§, @ift MiM a 
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more lasting and meaningful contribution to the long run develop-
ment goals of Niger than an unviable, transitory, borrower-
dominated institution can accomplish by pushing loans, on a one 
time basis, to a much larger number of recipients in its early 
phase of growth. 
The smaller institution, built on more careful loan evalu-
ation, risk analysis and more aggressive loan recovery efforts, 
would be developing banking skills to protect its long run 
viability. At the same time, it would be developing a healthy 
bank-client relationship with a reduced number of clients on a 
"continuing" basis. This would be built on trust and confidence 
that the institution is serious, non-political, with only minimal 
arrears, and able to provide future services because it is viable 
and able to turn over its portfolio for new loans. In contrast, 
the larger, more borrower dominated institution, though initially 
reaching a much larger number of "recipients" (rather than 
clients), would quickly be forced to abandon its role as a 
"financial" institution and become merely an administrative 
conduit that would eventually destroy its viability. The input 
delivery service could not be sustained, except through continual 
infusion of new funds to offset the rising rate of loan delin-
quency. There would be no effective "learning" of true banking 
skills, as described above for the smaller institution, and 
clearly no careful inculcation of a healthy "bank-client" rela-
tionship with its recipients. Tnese recipients, quite correctly, 
would note the "unviability" and "instability" of this insti-
tutioa, and quickly concluQe that it doesn•t pay to repay loans, 
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since there would likely be~ new loans available (as a reward 
for good behavior) for those who do. Thus an "unviable" insti-
tutional image induces and reinforces delinquent behavior on the 
part of its borrowers. 
In summary, there is a pressing need to alter the operational 
philosophy behind the current "model" of supplying rural financial 
services in Niger. The following suggestions are offered for 
discussion among donor and Nigerien officials. They are in no way 
intended to be definitive and the OSU team recognizes that some 
may not be ideally suited for the Nigerien setting. However we 
hope the insights offered will lead to a fruitful dialogue between 
donors and Nigerien authorities to restructure the current model 
for supplying rural financial services in Niger. In brief they 
are as follows: 
1. Size and Pace of Development: Any new institution should 
initially be relatively small in size and scope. This 
will allow for a more careful absorption of appropriate 
loan management procedures~ "learning" better liquidity 
and asset management skills, and carrying out loan 
recovery practices effectively. Important here is to 
avoid taking on large project clientele that could 
overwhelm its loan management capacity. This new 
institutional initiative could be undertaken in several 
branch settings on a "pilot" project. basis. 
2. Widening The Base of Financial Services to Include 
Deposit Services: (a) Deposits from the public at large 
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(similar to those in the post office network) offer an 
antidote to relying too heavily on government and ex-
ternal funding resources that create a "borrower-
dominated" bias in the institution. The more an insti-
tution relies on local deposits, the more concerned it 
becomes about maintaining financial viability to protect 
local depositor interests; (b) In the near future, the 
major source of potential depositors, for the limited 
number of branches envisioned here, would be the inhabi-
tants and producers in and around the regional towns of 
Niger {where the branches would be located). The more 
dispersed farm level producers would make up a clear 
minority. This m6re "depositor-dominated" institution 
would generate a healthy influence, inducing a sense of 
managerial discipline and responsibility guaranteeing 
more careful loan evaluation and loan recovery efforts~ 
(c) Deposit behavior would also generate useful informa-
tion for the institution to determine the creditworthiness 
of potential borrowers, and~ (d) Safe, convenient depo-
sits with a positive rat'e of return also represents a 
useful service to rural p~oducers. Deposit services of-
fer these producers short term, easy liquidity to smooth 
out seasonal fluctuations in their cash flow needs, as 
well as a secure alterR•tive to holding all of their 
savings in risky physi!c~l inv'entories { cro,ps and live-
stock) subject to dl~ea~~ drought, spoilage and theft. 
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3. Diversification of The LOan Portfolio: This 
accomplishes several objectives. Most important is the 
"diversification of risk" that all viable lenders must 
incorporate into their asset management strategies. 
LOans should not be too heavily concentrated into the 
riskiest operations and clientele. LOng term loans, 
associated with risky or problematical technological 
packages, should be minimized, and short term seasonal 
loans in agriculture emphasized. Shorter term seasonal 
loans are easier and less costly to administer and 
recover, and more susceptible to developing a continuous 
bank client relationship through time. Short term loans 
also "turnover" more rapidly than longer term loans, 
thereby adding more to the stream of interest earnings of 
the institution. Finally, some non-agricultural artisan 
and commercial loans from rural areas should be incor-
porated into the portfolio. Not only does this diversify 
risk (and offer credit to other "legitimate" rural 
activities), but it also helps "smooth out" the seasonal 
liquidity flows within the institution by introducing a 
different seasonal sequence of disbursement and recovery 
than agricultural loans to cooperatives and farmers. 
Where possible, loans to "monopsonistic" marketing 
agencies may be considered since they offer a secure 
conduit for guaranteeing repayment tf farmers' loans in 
specialized crops; however, this presumes that the 
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marketing agent is a reliable intermediary on behalf of 
the new institution. 
4. Relationship to Donors and Para-statal Organizations: The 
small, fledgling financial institution envisioned here 
should be protected from managing a portfolio (and 
dealing with a clientele) that could overwhelm its 
limited managerial capacity. This means that large donor 
projects, promoting risky, long term technological 
packages for a large number of participants, should not 
be "initially" drawn into the portfolio of this smaller 
scale institution. By the same token the institution 
should be protected from being forced to deal with 
potentially unresponsible para-statal clientele for 
reasons that are all too obvious. 
Donor support should be directed more towards loan 
guarantees, technical assistance, and subsidizing the 
build up of new human capital for this institution. This 
would imply transforming the civil servant mentality to 
one incorporating more business-oriented, banking skills 
in liquidity and asset management, risk and credit-
worthiness analyses, etc. At the same time, new 
"performance indicators" should be developed in which 
donors would reward good performance by matching the 
domestic deposit mobilizati~n and good loan recovery 
efforts rather than emphasiming quick loan disbursements 
to high cost, targeted cliea~~le. In the same vein, 
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donors should minimize the costly screening, documen-
tation and reporting requirements on the final alleged 
clientele of the institution and, instead, emphasize 
documentation of loan recovery analyses and related loan 
management and accounting procedures that directly 
contribute to the viability of the institution. 
s. Internal Management Reforms: The dimensions of reor-
ganization and reform outlined above imply substantial 
managerial changes from those that have characterized 
past practices in the CNCA. Broadening the range of 
financial services to include deposit services, and 
diversifying the portfolio into a less risky mix of short 
and medium term loans and non-agricultural as well as 
agricultural loans, calls for skills in liquidity and 
cash flow management between liabilities and assets, and 
portfolio and risk analysis. All these managerial 
responsibilities are inherent to an institution that 
presumes to break away from a simple wholesale lending 
role into one that undertakes greater decentralized, 
autonomous, retail functions of servicing a diverse loan 
and deposit clientele. Finally some degree of 
"accountability" should be built into the managerial 
roles. Managers registering a good performance on 
effective documentation and control of loan evaluation, 
loan recovery, and deposit mobiliza\ion should be 
rewarded accordingly. No comparable rewards should be 
available for poor performance. 
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Given this challenge, starting small and growing 
slowly with experience is advisable. Moreover new 
information systems are necessary to document and produce 
the appropriate financial and economic data needed for 
effective decisionmaking on loan evaluation, risk analy-
sis, and loan recovery efforts. Microcomputers with 
suitable software programs are indispensible tools to 
process quickly the information needed to track and 
forecast loan performance, identify potential problem 
areas and trigger effective loan recovery actions. 
International donor support in training the human capital 
base and financing the hardware and software investments 
in this pilot project could make an important contri-
bution in launching a new model of supplying financial 
services to rural Niger. 
The above agenda identifies some of the more important 
problem areas that should be addressed in any restructuring and 
reform of the institutional supply of rural financial services in 
Niger. The more explicit role for financial intermediation per se 
pointed out above (i.e. mobilizing deposits as well as allocating 
credit) suggests that a more full service dimension should be 
considered, in order to benefit from information economies and the 
efficiencies gained through the increased scope of services 
offered rural clientele. The diversification of the portfolio ~0t 
only reduces risk, but allows for a ~reater rate of return through 
mote rapid loan turnover. The small pilot project approach makes 
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sense to gain experience and allow for adjustments as the experi-
ment continues. Finally the new operational framework represents a 
fruitful challenge to government officials, on the one hand, and 
international donors on the other hand, to rethink their past 
mistaken approaches to the issue of creating a viable financial 
intermediary for rural Niger. 
